Opinion Library

Ortiz v. Flores

COA01

After the trial court signed a final order dismissing James Ortiz’s case for want of prosecution, Ortiz (pro se) waited more than five months to file his notice of appeal. The First Court of Appeals treated the deadline to perfect appeal as strictly jurisdictional under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because Ortiz filed no post-judgment motion that would extend the appellate timetable from 30 to 90 days (e.g., motion for new trial or motion to reinstate), and he did not file within the additional 15-day extension window with a motion to extend, his notice was untimely. Lacking a timely notice of appeal, the appellate court held it had no authority to reach the merits and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, also dismissing pending motions as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family cases, the notice-of-appeal deadline is a hard jurisdictional gate: miss the 30-day deadline (or the 90-day deadline if extended by a timely post-judgment motion) and the court of appeals cannot help you—ever. Calendar the signed-date immediately, file a motion for new trial/reinstate when appropriate to extend deadlines, and if you’re late, use the 15-day TRAP 26.3 window with a motion to extend; otherwise your opponent’s judgment becomes effectively appeal-proof."

General trial issues

Salmeron v. Atascocita Forest Community Association

COA01

Homeowners who had sued to stop an HOA foreclosure were electronically served with the HOA’s plea to the jurisdiction and notice of submission, but they did not respond by the submission date and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. On motion for new trial, the homeowners argued Hurricane Beryl caused a power/internet “system outage” that prevented timely receipt of e-service and warranted relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(6), along with a three-day extension under Rule 21a(c) and relief under the Craddock framework. The First Court of Appeals held that Rule 21(f)(6) does not provide automatic tolling based on a general disaster; the movant must present specific, evidence-backed facts showing when notice was actually received or when the outage ended and why they could not act (including seeking a continuance) once access was restored. Because the homeowners offered no concrete timeline for restoration of electricity/access or diligent efforts to monitor e-service—and their participation in a later hearing undercut the claim that they were unable to engage with the court—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial and letting the dismissal stand. The court also held the three-day rule for mail service does not apply to e-service, and the motion for new trial was too conclusory to satisfy Craddock’s “no conscious indifference” requirement.

Litigation Takeaway

"E-service deadlines start immediately and aren’t automatically extended by storms or outages. If you miss a deadline and claim a “technical failure,” you must prove it with a detailed outage timeline (when access returned/when notice was actually seen), show diligent efforts to check the case, and seek prompt relief (e.g., continuance/extension) as soon as you can—otherwise the judgment/dismissal is likely to stand."

In Re Benjamin Oshea Calhoun

COA01

Benjamin Oshea Calhoun (pro se) filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First Court of Appeals seeking a reduction of bail set in his pending Harris County criminal case. The court focused on subject-matter jurisdiction, contrasting (1) Texas Government Code § 22.221(d), which gives intermediate courts of appeals original habeas jurisdiction only when a person is restrained for violating an order, judgment, or decree in a civil case (i.e., civil-contempt-type restraints), with (2) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.05, which vests original criminal habeas jurisdiction in the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. Because Calhoun sought original habeas relief directed to a criminal bond issue—outside the narrow civil-order restraint contemplated by § 22.221(d)—the court held it had no original habeas jurisdiction to consider the request and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (without reaching the merits, and noting the petition’s TRAP 52 defects were not the primary basis for disposition).

Litigation Takeaway

"Forum-check habeas relief. Texas courts of appeals can entertain original habeas only for restraints tied to violation of a civil-case order (common in family-law contempt); they cannot take original habeas to reduce criminal bail. If the restraint is criminal (even if factually related to a family dispute), file original habeas in the proper trial court under Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05 and reach the court of appeals only through appellate review."

VKA Investments, LLC v. Anthony Baiamonte, III

COA01

After the parties mediated a settlement while an appeal was abated, they filed an agreed joint motion asking the First Court of Appeals to reinstate the appeal solely to dismiss it, tax costs per their agreement, and—critically—issue the mandate immediately. Applying TRAP 42.1(a)(1) (dismissal by agreement), TRAP 42.1(d) (costs by agreement), and TRAP 18.1(c) (mandate may issue with the judgment by agreement), the court treated the settlement as controlling and found no reason to keep the merits alive. The court reinstated the case on its docket, dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits, ordered each side to bear its own appellate costs, and directed the clerk to issue the mandate concurrently with the opinion and judgment, eliminating the usual post-judgment waiting period and making the trial-court judgment immediately final for practical purposes.

Litigation Takeaway

"When an appeal settles—especially in divorce or custody cases where delay can be leverage—don’t just dismiss the appeal. File an agreed joint motion that (1) dismisses under TRAP 42.1 and (2) expressly requests an immediate mandate under TRAP 18.1(c). That single request can collapse the normal rehearing/petition timeline, accelerate finality, and help lock in settlement performance (QDROs, property transfers, schedule changes) before “buyer’s remorse” or appellate gamesmanship sets in."

Landers v. Norwood

COA01

In Landers v. LDG Norwood, the appellant appealed a Harris County civil court judgment but failed to file an opening brief by the October 13, 2025 deadline. After the deadline passed, the First Court of Appeals issued a clerk’s notice on October 23, 2025 warning that the appeal would be dismissed unless the appellant filed a brief or a motion for extension within ten days. The appellant did neither. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.3 (involuntary dismissal for failure to comply with rules/court notices) and 43.2(f) (dismissal as a form of appellate judgment), the court treated the non-filing and non-response as abandonment of the appeal and concluded that, without a brief or explanation, there was nothing to review and no basis to keep the case on the docket. The court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution and dismissed any pending motions as moot, leaving the trial court’s judgment intact.

Litigation Takeaway

"Appeals can be lost on paperwork, not merits: if you miss the brief deadline and ignore a TRAP 42.3 warning notice, the court will summarily dismiss the appeal—so docket monitoring, calendaring, and prompt motions for extension are essential (especially in fast-paced family-law/accelerated appeals)."

Property Division

Kimberly Pickens v. Robert J. Hewitt

COA13

In Pickens v. Hewitt, the estate of a woman who died of alcohol poisoning sued a commercial landlord, arguing the landlord had a duty to evict a tenant for overserving alcohol because the lease allowed for termination in the event of illegal acts. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a landlord's contractual right to terminate a lease for law violations equates to 'actual control' over the premises under Texas liability principles. The court held that such a provision is intended to protect the landlord's interests, not to safeguard third parties, and affirmed summary judgment for the landlord, ruling he owed no legal duty to the deceased patron.

Litigation Takeaway

"A landlord’s contractual right to evict a tenant for illegal conduct does not create a legal duty to protect third parties from the tenant’s negligence. For family law practitioners, this provides a vital defense to shield a 'passive' spouse or a real estate holding entity from the operational liabilities and tort judgments arising from a business run by the other spouse."

In re Charles Deus

COA03

In this original proceeding, the relator sought mandamus relief compelling the Travis County trial court to hold a hearing on his “Motion to Re-Instate Access.” The Third Court of Appeals focused on the procedural requirements for mandamus: the relator must provide a mandamus record showing the trial court was asked to perform a ministerial act (here, setting/holding a hearing) and then failed or refused to do so. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 52 and authorities such as In re Golz and In re Tarkington, the court held that filing a motion alone does not establish trial-court inaction; the record must include proof of an express request for a hearing (e.g., correspondence or a formal setting request to the court or coordinator). Because Deus provided no record evidence that he requested a hearing or setting, he failed to show a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a ministerial duty, and the court denied mandamus.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you want mandamus for a trial court’s failure to set a hearing, build a “mandamus-ready” paper trail: file a written request for setting/notice of hearing, email the coordinator, keep receipts, and include those communications in the mandamus record. A pending motion—without proof you asked for a hearing—won’t support mandamus relief."

Property Division

Landry v. Currie

COA10

After a catastrophic motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated employee, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed findings of negligent entrustment and respondeat superior liability against a business owner and his entity. The court analyzed whether the owner's direction for the employee to return a vehicle to a "company yard" fell under the "mission" exception to the coming-and-going rule, concluding the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. Ultimately, the court held that the owner was individually liable for negligent entrustment because the duty of care extends to the specific circumstances of the entrustment, and it upheld multi-million dollar noneconomic damage awards for physical impairment and mental anguish.

Litigation Takeaway

"Business owners and their spouses must be aware that individual liability for 'negligent entrustment' can create massive community debts that may liquidate family assets during a divorce; however, an innocent spouse may have a claim for 'waste' or 'reconstitution' if the other spouse's gross negligence led to the liability."

General trial issues

Moir Watershed Services, LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann

COA10

In Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC, a Texas-based company sued a New York law firm in a Texas court for legal malpractice and breach of contract. The New York firm challenged the lawsuit, arguing that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them since they were based in New York and the work was performed there. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case, holding that merely entering into a contract with a Texas resident does not establish the 'purposeful availment' necessary for jurisdiction. The court concluded that because the legal services were performed outside of Texas and the defendants did not specifically target the Texas market, they lacked the minimum contacts required to be sued in a Texas forum.

Litigation Takeaway

"Hiring an out-of-state attorney or expert for your legal matter does not guarantee you can sue them in Texas if something goes wrong. If their work is performed in their home state and they haven't purposefully reached into Texas to conduct business, you may be forced to litigate any malpractice or fee disputes in their jurisdiction, significantly increasing your costs and risks."

Property Division

Ford v. State

COA13

In Ford v. State, a defendant appealed his capital murder conviction, challenging the seizure of evidence from a vehicle registered in his name. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether a party maintains a Fourth Amendment 'reasonable expectation of privacy' in property that has been legally awarded to an ex-spouse. The court held that a final divorce decree serves as a constitutional boundary; because the decree awarded the vehicle to the victim, the defendant's possessory and privacy interests were extinguished. As a result, the defendant lacked standing to challenge the search, regardless of whether the title had been formally transferred.

Litigation Takeaway

"A final divorce decree is a powerful tool that immediately terminates a spouse's privacy rights in awarded property. Practitioners should draft decrees with extreme specificity—including VINs and clear divestiture clauses—to ensure that an ex-spouse cannot later claim constitutional protections to block the discovery of evidence or the enforcement of property rights."