Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
788 opinions found
P. J. S., Appellant v. K. S. S., Appellee
COA03
In P. J. S. v. K. S. S., a former husband challenged a summary judgment requiring him to pay a 'Guaranteed Amount' shortfall to his ex-wife as outlined in their Partition Agreement Incident to Divorce (PAID). The husband argued that because his payments were 'subject to' and secondary to a bank's priority debt, he was not obligated to pay if business profits were insufficient. The Third Court of Appeals disagreed, analyzing the contract language to find that 'subject to' established an order of distribution (who gets paid first) rather than a condition precedent (whether he has to pay at all). Because the agreement lacked specific conditional wording like 'if and only if,' the court held the husband was personally liable for the shortfall regardless of the business's net profits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, 'subject to' language in a settlement agreement typically establishes payment priority rather than excusing the debt entirely; if a payor intends to limit their liability to available business profits, the agreement must use express conditional language or explicitly disclaim personal liability for shortfalls."
Opinion by Justice Triana
COA03
In this case, a grandfather sought sole managing conservatorship of his three grandchildren following the death of their father, citing the mother's extreme and abusive disciplinary measures. The mother argued that her 'strict' parenting was protected by the legal 'parental presumption,' which usually favors keeping children with their parents. However, the court analyzed evidence showing the mother forced the children to stay outdoors overnight in freezing temperatures and neglected their medical and psychological needs, leading to fainting spells and suicidal ideation. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the grandfather successfully rebutted the parental presumption because the mother’s conduct posed a significant threat to the children’s physical health and emotional development.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'parental presumption' is not absolute; a non-parent can win custody by documenting a clear pattern of extreme disciplinary tactics, medical neglect, and the resulting psychological trauma to the children."
In the Matter of J.S.R., A Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile’s voluntary motion to dismiss an appeal was valid when it involved a waiver of statutory rights. While typical civil dismissals require only a signature from an attorney, the Court emphasized that Texas Family Code Section 51.09 imposes stricter "belt and suspenders" requirements for minors. The Court analyzed the motion and found that it correctly included signatures from both the juvenile and his attorney, as required by law. Consequently, the Court held the waiver was effective and granted the dismissal, highlighting that specific statutory protections for children take precedence over general appellate procedural rules.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any legal proceeding involving a minor’s rights—whether in juvenile delinquency or high-stakes family litigation—a standard signature from counsel is insufficient for a waiver. Under Texas Family Code Section 51.09, any waiver of a child's constitutional or statutory rights must be signed by both the minor and their attorney. To ensure the finality of a dismissal or settlement involving a minor, practitioners must strictly adhere to this dual-signature requirement."
In the matter of D.P.
COA02
In this juvenile law matter, the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old, D.P., to adult criminal court for prosecution of capital murder and aggravated robbery. D.P. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing probable cause and argued that the trial court improperly weighed his maturity and sophistication. The appellate court affirmed the transfer, holding that the State met its burden through detective testimony and physical evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court acted within its discretion under Texas Family Code § 54.02 by identifying D.P.'s 'level of planning' and premeditation as clear indicators of adult-like sophistication, which outweighed his lack of a prior criminal record.
Litigation Takeaway
"When litigating a minor’s maturity or capacity—whether in juvenile transfer hearings or high-conflict custody disputes involving delinquent behavior—Texas courts prioritize evidence of 'planning' and 'organization' over a lack of prior history to determine if a child should be held to adult-level standards of accountability."
IN THE INTEREST OF T.F., A CHILD
COA02
In this case, a father appealed the termination of his parental rights. His court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that after a thorough review of the record, there were no valid legal grounds for an appeal, and simultaneously moved to withdraw as counsel. The Second Court of Appeals performed its own independent review of the record and agreed that the appeal was frivolous, affirming the trial court's termination order. However, the court denied the attorney's motion to withdraw. Applying the Texas Supreme Court's standard from In re P.M., the court held that an appointed attorney’s duty in a termination case continues through the filing of a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, and the mere fact that an appeal is frivolous does not constitute 'good cause' to allow an attorney to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney’s obligation to their client is extensive; filing an Anders brief due to a lack of merit does not automatically permit the attorney to withdraw. Counsel must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court stage unless they can demonstrate specific 'good cause'—such as a conflict of interest—that is independent of the appeal's lack of merit."
In the Interest of I.H., A Child
COA02
A father challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not transported from jail for his trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the father's history of substance abuse and his repeated refusal to submit to court-ordered drug testing, concluding that such refusals create a legal inference of ongoing drug use. The court held that this "presumption of use," combined with the child's drug exposure at birth, supported an endangerment finding. Additionally, the court held that because the father's attorney did not explicitly raise a constitutional objection to the father's absence during the trial, those due process claims were waived for appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Refusing a court-ordered drug test is not a neutral act; Texas courts treat a refusal as substantive evidence of illegal drug use and child endangerment. Furthermore, if a parent is unable to attend a hearing, counsel must explicitly cite constitutional due process grounds on the record to preserve the right to appeal that absence."
In re Juan Pardo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Juan Pardo sought to vacate trial court orders for his arrest via ex parte writs of attachment. Although Pardo was represented by two attorneys of record, he filed the petition pro se. The Real Party in Interest moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.' The Thirteenth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a party in a civil case cannot represent themselves while concurrently being represented by counsel. Because the petition was procedurally improper, the court dismissed it without prejudice and lifted a previously granted emergency stay, effectively exposing the Relator to the trial court's enforcement orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pro se filings made by a party who is still represented by counsel of record are considered a procedural nullity. Clients must formalize the termination of their legal representation before attempting to file original proceedings independently, or they risk immediate dismissal and the loss of emergency stays."
HIGH RISK PREGNANCY DOCTORS, PLLC AND VIOLETTA LOZOVYY, Appellants v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY D/B/A LINCOLN HARRIS CSG AND DOUGLAS MACLAY III, Appellees
COA02
In High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Dr. Violetta Lozovyy’s dispute with a leasing agent and landlord, the plaintiffs claimed they were induced to sign a commercial lease by an oral promise that the lease would be “ineffective” or otherwise “dealt with” if Dr. Lozovyy failed to obtain hospital staff privileges within 120 days. The written lease, however, unambiguously required those privileges and contained no contingency or “escape hatch.” The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the Rule 91a standard, held the fraud claim failed as a matter of law because “justifiable reliance” cannot be based on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the clear terms of the signed contract. The court also held the DTPA claim was time-barred: the two-year limitations period was not tolled by the discovery rule because the alleged injury—the contradictory contract language—was discoverable at signing, and failing to read the contract is a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the written agreement says one thing and an alleged oral promise says another, Texas courts treat reliance on the oral promise as legally unjustifiable—making fraud-based attempts to unwind a signed deal vulnerable to early dismissal. In family cases, this is strong authority to defeat “side-deal” or “work-around” claims attacking MSAs/Rule 11 agreements and to resist late-filed fraud/DTPA-style claims where the complaining party could have discovered the issue by reading what they signed."
Espinoza v. State
COA02
In Espinoza v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty under a negotiated “charge-bargain” in which the State dismissed multiple counts in exchange for guilty pleas to two counts. As part of the bargain, he executed a written waiver of the right to appeal, and the trial court’s Rule 25.2(d) certification reflected that it was a plea-bargain case with no right of appeal. Espinoza nevertheless filed a notice of appeal. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) and (d), and relying on Harper v. State recognizing a charge bargain as a plea bargain that triggers Rule 25.2’s appeal restrictions, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because the record contained an accurate certification showing no right of appeal and there was no permission to appeal or preserved pretrial motion issue. The court dismissed the appeal under Rule 43.2(f).
Litigation Takeaway
"A negotiated criminal “charge-bargain” that includes a written waiver of appeal can make the conviction immediately final for practical purposes—eliminating “appeal limbo.” In family-law crossover cases, that finality can speed fault-based divorce theories tied to a felony conviction and strengthen custody/property arguments by removing uncertainty about whether the conviction will be overturned."
In the Interest of M.L.L., A.M.L., and B.F.L., Children
COA07
In a parental termination proceeding, a mother sought to introduce evidence of events occurring prior to a 2018 divorce decree. The trial court excluded this evidence, citing res judicata. On appeal, the mother argued this exclusion was improper. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which require a party to preserve error by making an "offer of proof" when evidence is excluded. The court held that because the mother failed to make an offer of proof regarding what the excluded testimony would have shown, the appellate court could not conduct a harm analysis. Consequently, the mother waived her right to challenge the exclusion, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court excludes evidence, simply objecting is not enough; you must make a formal or informal 'offer of proof' for the record to show the appellate court exactly what that evidence would have been and why its exclusion was harmful."