Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
788 opinions found
RANCHO DE LOS ARBOLES LLC AND ELLEN EAKIN v. TOWN OF CROSS ROADS, TX
COA02
Rancho De Los Arboles LLC and its principal sued the Town of Cross Roads after the Town began enforcing zoning ordinances to shut down their long-running short‑term rental use. Rancho sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging Texas-constitutional property violations (including takings/due course of law theories) and asserting ultra vires conduct. The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, and the trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Applying the Miranda plea-to-the-jurisdiction framework, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that a dismissal with prejudice is proper only when the pleadings or record affirmatively negate jurisdiction as a matter of law (i.e., the defect is incurable). Where the problem is merely insufficient pleading of jurisdictional facts that could be cured by amendment—such as failing to plead takings elements with specificity or failing to name the proper officials for an ultra vires claim—the plaintiff must be given a chance to replead. The court affirmed dismissal of those claims that were jurisdictionally barred on the record, but held the trial court reversibly erred by dismissing the remainder with prejudice without allowing Rancho an opportunity to amend. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the potentially curable constitutional and ultra vires theories.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plea to the jurisdiction is not automatically a “case killer.” If governmental immunity is raised and your petition is merely thin—not incurably barred—push hard for the right to amend. Preserve error by requesting leave to replead and objecting to any “with prejudice” dismissal, especially when asserting constitutional property/takings or ultra vires claims tied to real estate value in a divorce-related crossover dispute."
EDWARD GENE MOODY JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
COA02
In Moody v. State, the defendant challenged a felony DWI conviction, arguing (1) the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause for a compelled blood draw and (2) the State failed to prove the two prior DWI convictions (“jurisdictional priors”) required to elevate the offense to a felony. Applying the highly deferential totality-of-the-circumstances review and the “four corners” rule, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause where the affidavit described a vehicle accident, witness reports that the defendant smelled of alcohol and threw beer cans into a ditch, the officer’s own odor-of-alcohol observation, failed field sobriety tests, and the defendant’s admission he drank two 24-ounce beers. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to link Moody to the 1995 and 2022 DWI judgments for enhancement purposes; remoteness did not undermine the priors’ validity, and the State provided documentation and corroborating testimony connecting Moody to those convictions. The court affirmed the felony DWI conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and SAPCR cases, don’t dismiss “old” alcohol-related convictions or a parent’s calm demeanor during an incident. Build an endangerment narrative using (1) certified priors (even decades old) and (2) contemporaneous, concrete “four corners” facts from police/fire/witness reports (accident details, odor, discarded containers, refusals, admissions) to support testing requests and restrictions like supervised visitation."
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal."
Morrison v. Morrison
Supreme Court of Texas
In Morrison v. Morrison, a former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree after her ex-husband allegedly damaged their marital home and failed to return various items of personal property. Although the original decree split the home sale proceeds 50/50, the trial court awarded the wife 100% of the proceeds as damages without making specific findings regarding the fair market value (FMV) of the losses. The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the distinction between the power to 'enforce' a decree under Family Code Chapter 9 and the prohibition against 'modifying' a substantive property division. The Court held that while trial courts can award money judgments for breaches, they impermissibly modify a decree when they reallocate community assets without a direct evidentiary link to the proven fair market value of the damaged or missing property.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully recover damages for damaged or missing assets after a divorce, you must provide specific evidence of fair market value; a court cannot simply reallocate property interests as a penalty for bad behavior without a dollar-for-dollar evidentiary accounting."
In the Interest of K.K. and K.K., Children
COA12
In this parental termination case, the appellant (J.K.) filed a notice of appeal six days after the mandatory 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals. Although the notice was filed within the 15-day 'grace period' allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, the Twelfth Court of Appeals notified J.K. that a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay was required to maintain jurisdiction. Because the appellant failed to respond to the court’s inquiry or provide any explanation for the late filing, the court held it was powerless to grant an extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that procedural rules apply equally to pro se litigants and licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines in parental termination cases are extremely strict and accelerated; missing the 20-day filing window—and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation for the delay—will result in the permanent loss of your right to appeal."
Dennis Maurice Jones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Jones v. State, the defendant sought to introduce his mother’s testimony about his mental-health history during an aggravated-assault trial. When the State objected on relevance, defense counsel expressly told the trial court the testimony was offered only to support an insanity defense and “not attempting to get any sort of lesser included reckless charge.” The trial court excluded the testimony. On appeal, Jones argued the exclusion was error because the evidence would have supported a lesser-included offense instruction. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the “matching” preservation doctrine (Clark v. State), holding the appellate complaint did not match what was requested at trial. Because counsel affirmatively disclaimed the lesser-included theory, the trial court was never asked to rule on admissibility for that purpose and there was no preserved error to review. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not “narrow-proffer” yourself into an appellate waiver. If evidence is relevant to multiple theories (e.g., best interest, statutory presumptions, significant impairment, danger), state all applicable grounds and avoid affirmative disclaimers like “not for X.” Appellate courts will hold you to the exact theory presented to the trial judge, and a trial-level disclaimer can permanently foreclose a later appeal."
In re Hector Hernandez
COA08
After obtaining a writ of execution to recover property, Hector Hernandez filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the El Paso Court of Appeals because the County Sheriff refused to enforce the writ. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), which limits its original mandamus jurisdiction to actions against specific judges, not executive officials like sheriffs. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to compel a sheriff to act unless such an order was necessary to protect the court's own jurisdiction. Because Hernandez had not first filed a mandamus action against the sheriff in a district court, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot "leapfrog" the trial court when a sheriff or constable refuses to execute a writ. To compel a county official to perform a ministerial duty, you must first file a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court; filing directly in the court of appeals will result in a jurisdictional dismissal."
Jonathan Humber v. City of Palestine
COA12
In Humber v. City of Palestine, the appellant filed a motion for new trial 32 days after the trial court signed the final judgment. The appellant later filed a notice of appeal nearly three months after the judgment, assuming the post-judgment motion had extended the appellate deadline. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, which requires a "timely" post-judgment motion to extend the filing deadline for a notice of appeal from 30 to 90 days. The court held that an untimely motion for new trial is a nullity for purposes of the appellate timetable and does not extend the court's jurisdiction, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A motion for new trial must be filed within 30 days of the date the judge signs the order to extend the appellate deadline; filing even one day late means your notice of appeal remains due 30 days from the judgment, potentially terminating your right to appeal."
Omiagbo v. Whitcomb
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed a pro se appeal after the appellant failed to rectify systemic briefing deficiencies in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. Despite being issued a formal deficiency notice and granted an opportunity to amend, the appellant's second submission lacked essential record citations, an alphabetical index of authorities, and substantive legal analysis. The court held that while pro se filings are liberally construed, non-attorneys are held to the same procedural standards as licensed counsel to maintain the integrity of the adversarial process, and persistent failure to provide a compliant brief warrants dismissal under Rule 38.9(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Pro se litigants must follow the same appellate briefing rules as licensed attorneys; if an opposing party fails to anchor their appeal in the record or substantive law after being warned, practitioners can leverage procedural rules to secure a dismissal and save clients the expense of a full merits response."
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim and challenges to court costs. The appellant argued trial counsel made specific mistakes (e.g., failing to object or pursue certain defensive theories), but the court analyzed counsel’s performance under Strickland by looking at the “totality of representation” rather than isolated alleged errors. Because the record reflected an active, strategic defense—particularly cross-examination emphasizing the lack of recovered stolen property and gaps in the State’s physical evidence—the appellant failed to show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Separately, the court audited the bill of costs and held that clerk-assessed fees must be supported by the record; it struck an unsupported $55 subpoena service fee where no return of service or evidence justified it. The court also held that an administrative bill of costs cannot override the trial court’s judgment on timing of payment; because the judgment made costs payable upon release, the appellant was not required to pay while confined. The convictions were affirmed, and the bill of costs was modified to delete the unsupported fee.
Litigation Takeaway
"IAC claims are hard to win when the record shows counsel was “in the fight”—courts evaluate the whole trial, not a checklist of alleged missteps. In family cases (especially termination), build a record reflecting active advocacy and strategy to blunt Strickland attacks. Also, don’t accept boilerplate costs at face value: line-item audit bills of cost and move to strike fees not supported by the record, and enforce decree/judgment language on when costs are actually payable (e.g., not until release from confinement)."