Opinion Library

In Re Krystal D. Hunter

COA14

Krystal Hunter filed a petition for writ of mandamus asking the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to pause (abate) a third-party intervenor's claims in her family law case. The appellate court denied the petition, concluding that Hunter failed to meet the high burden required for extraordinary relief. The court analyzed the trial court's decision under a two-part test, determining that managing the timing of an intervention is a discretionary function of the trial court and that Hunter failed to show the court was legally required to stop the proceedings. Furthermore, the court held that any potential errors could be addressed through the standard appeal process after a final judgment, meaning Hunter did not lack an adequate remedy at law.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas family law, stopping an intervenor from participating in your case via an emergency mandamus petition is extremely difficult. Because trial judges have broad discretion over their own dockets, you must demonstrate either a mandatory legal requirement to pause the case or show "irreparable harm" that cannot be fixed on a normal appeal later. Practically, it is often more effective to challenge an intervenor's standing early through a Motion to Strike rather than seeking a mid-litigation pause."

Enforcement of Agreements and Orders

Leslie Parrish v. The State of Texas

COA14

In Parrish v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether a seven-year delay in executing an arrest warrant barred the revocation of community supervision. The appellant asserted a "due diligence" defense; however, the court held that this statutory defense is strictly limited to violations for failure to report or failure to remain in a specified location. Because the State proved a separate violation—failure to provide written employment verification—the court affirmed the revocation, noting that a single proven violation is sufficient. Additionally, the court modified the judgment to remove a fine that was included in the written order but never orally pronounced by the judge, confirming that the oral pronouncement controls in the event of a conflict.

Litigation Takeaway

"A single technical violation of court-ordered supervision, such as failing to provide employment paperwork, is enough to support a revocation regardless of "due diligence" defenses on other counts. Always cross-reference the court's oral ruling against the written judgment to ensure no unauthorized fines or conditions were added."

Sherie A. McArthur, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CLARENCE MAURICE LOGAN, JR., Appellant V. CONCORD HOUSTON JFK BLVD HOTEL II LLC, A TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; CONCORD HOSPITALITY ENTERPRISES COMPANY, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND DOES 1-20, Appellees

COA14

In McArthur v. Concord Houston JFK Blvd Hotel II LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed an appellant's failure to prosecute their appeal. After the clerk's record was filed, the appellant failed to file a brief or a motion for extension for several months. The court issued a formal 10-day warning under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b), often called a 'death notice,' requiring a response to avoid dismissal. When the appellant ignored the notice, the court analyzed the procedural failure under Rule 42.3 and held that dismissal for want of prosecution was necessary. The court concluded that ignoring mandatory briefing deadlines and subsequent show-cause orders effectively abandons the appeal, leaving the panel no choice but to dismiss without reaching the merits.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas appellate law, deadlines are not mere suggestions; missing a briefing deadline and failing to respond to a court's 10-day 'death notice' will result in the summary dismissal of your case, making the trial court's judgment final and unappealable regardless of the merits of your claim."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Brown v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Move-out disclaimers can become legal waivers: if a party tells police, a landlord, or a court “I don’t live there,” that statement can be used to establish abandonment and defeat privacy/standing arguments—making warrantless entry/search more defensible based on third-party consent. In family-law crossovers (protective orders, divorce/custody disputes), counsel should carefully manage residency/possession statements and build evidence of continuing ties (keys, utilities, mail, property left behind) if privacy or possessory rights will matter."

Child Custody

William Delawrence Lewis v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Lewis, the First Court of Appeals considered whether evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for failure to stop and render aid when the defendant claimed he never collided with the crashed vehicle. Witnesses and reconstruction evidence showed Lewis drove a high-performance car at extreme speeds while “pacing” another car in apparent competitive driving for more than a mile; the other car then lost control, crashed, and caused a death and serious injury, and Lewis did not stop. Applying Tex. Transp. Code §§ 550.021 and 550.023 and precedent holding that “involved” is broader than “collision,” the court focused on whether Lewis’s conduct contributed to the accident. The court held that even without definitive proof of physical contact, a rational jury could find Lewis was “involved” because his high-speed, side-by-side driving was a contributing factor in the sequence of events, and credibility conflicts about contact were for the jury. The conviction was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas, you don’t always need proof of an actual impact to show someone was “involved” in a dangerous incident—participation in high-risk, competitive driving can be enough. In custody and divorce cases, that makes it easier to frame reckless behavior (and related criminal exposure) as endangering conduct for best-interest restrictions and as fault/waste considerations in a “just and right” property division."

Evidence

Bictor Guzman v. The State of Texas

COA14

In Guzman v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed the requirements for admitting jailhouse call recordings into evidence. The defendant challenged the authentication of calls linked to his 'System Person Number' (SPN), arguing the State hadn't proven he was the speaker. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Evidence 901, determining that authentication is a 'low hurdle' satisfied by a combination of voice identification from a witness familiar with the speaker and technical data from a records custodian. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings, as the proponent only needs to produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find the evidence is genuine, rather than ruling out every other possibility of identity theft or PIN sharing.

Litigation Takeaway

"Jailhouse recordings are a powerful and accessible evidentiary tool in high-conflict litigation. To overcome authentication objections, practitioners should pair testimony from a witness who can identify the party's voice with jail records linking the call to the party's unique ID number. This 'low hurdle' for admission means that even if an opposing party claims someone else used their PIN, the recording will likely be admitted, leaving the weight of that evidence to be decided by the trier of fact."

Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.

COA01

After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if you miss the 30-day notice-of-appeal deadline (and the 15-day extension window), you’re out—unless you properly perfect a restricted appeal. If you need a restricted appeal, your notice must expressly track TRAP 25.1(d)(7)’s required statements; a generic notice of appeal cannot be “converted” later by briefing or argument."

Venisha Arnold v. Google LLC, YouTube LLC, Alphabet, Inc, Reddit, Inc, Felixlightner-Reddit Thread Starter, Rechlin-Reddit Admin, Boshau-Reddit Admin, Munx1er-Reddit Admin, Swhitt-Reddit Admin, and Texlex-Reddit Admin.

COA01

In Arnold, the appellant attempted to immediately appeal an order granting one defendant’s Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order dismissed only Reddit, left other defendants in the case, and expressly reserved the mandatory award of attorney’s fees/costs and potential sanctions for later determination—making the order interlocutory rather than final. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its jurisdiction under the final-judgment rule and the limited statutory authorizations for interlocutory appeals, focusing on Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which allows an interlocutory appeal only from an order that denies a TCPA motion to dismiss. Because the Legislature did not authorize an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a TCPA motion, and the order was not otherwise final, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Litigation Takeaway

"TCPA asymmetry matters: if you win a TCPA motion to dismiss (including in divorce/SAPCR “family tort” skirmishes), your opponent generally cannot take an immediate appeal and must wait until a final judgment—unless the case is severed and made final. Conversely, if your TCPA motion is denied, you can appeal immediately. Plan orders and severance strategy with finality and fee issues in mind."

Tumey v. Crawford

COA14

In Tumey v. Crawford, the appellant attempted to appeal a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). However, the appellee’s request for mandatory attorney’s fees remained unresolved in the trial court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(12), which specifically authorizes interlocutory appeals only when a TCPA motion is denied, not when it is granted. Following the principle that judgments are not final until all claims—including attorney's fees—are resolved, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and dismissed the case.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas, you cannot immediately appeal the granting of a TCPA dismissal if the issue of attorney’s fees is still pending; for family law litigants, this means a successful movant can effectively block an opponent's appeal by keeping the fee adjudication active in the trial court."

Termination of Parental Rights

Cirilo Gomez-Lagunas v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Gomez-Lagunas v. State, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief in a murder appeal, asserting the record presented no non-frivolous issues. The First Court of Appeals performed its required independent review of the entire record under Anders and Texas Anders cases (including High and Bledsoe), found no arguable grounds for reversal and no reversible error, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the 35-year sentence. For family-law purposes, the opinion underscores that an Anders affirmance reflects both counsel’s and the appellate court’s conclusion that there is no viable appellate challenge, strengthening arguments that the conviction is final and reliable for later Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(L) and (Q) termination predicates.

Litigation Takeaway

"When an incarcerated parent’s conviction has been affirmed after an Anders review, treat it as a strong finality milestone: use the memorandum opinion and mandate to defeat “pending appeal” delay tactics and to support TPR predicate grounds based on serious criminal conduct or long-term incarceration (e.g., § 161.001(b)(1)(L) and (Q))."