Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
788 opinions found
Kist v. Kist
COA14
Kathryn Kist sought to lift a geographic residency restriction to relocate her four children from Texas to Indiana, presenting evidence of a $70,000 job offer, free housing from her parents, and access to private schooling. She argued that the father, Jonathan, was largely uninvolved and that staying in Texas was a financial hardship. Jonathan contested the move, presenting evidence of his involvement and the children's stability in their current environment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the conflict using the Lenz factors and Texas public policy favoring 'frequent and continuing contact' with both parents. The court held that because the trial court faced conflicting testimony regarding the father’s involvement and the children's best interests, it did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the residency restriction or in characterizing Jonathan's post-petition home purchase as his separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"Financial gain and a better support system out-of-state are not enough to guarantee a relocation; you must prove the move serves the children's best interests while maintaining the other parent's relationship. Because these cases are so fact-dependent, a trial court's decision to maintain the status quo is extremely difficult to overrule on appeal."
In the Interest of K.L., A Child
COA07
In this parental termination case, a mother appealed a court order terminating her rights after she failed to appear at the final hearing, claiming she lacked actual notice of the trial setting. The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, ruling that the mother waived her due process challenge by failing to raise the issue in the trial court through a motion for new trial. Furthermore, the court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, notice provided to a party's attorney is legally imputed to the client. The court emphasized that the mother’s specific instructions to her attorney regarding the hearing—given just days prior to the trial—established that she had actual knowledge of the proceeding, thereby satisfying constitutional notice requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
"Notice given to an attorney is legally considered notice to the client; if a party fails to appear for trial, any claim regarding a lack of notice must be preserved in the trial court via a motion for new trial or it will be waived on appeal."
Gannon v. The State of Texas
COA02
After Dayton Joseph Gannon was convicted of aggravated robbery for brandishing a knife and aggressively posturing toward a victim through a laundromat's glass door, he appealed, arguing that the threat of injury was not 'imminent' because the victim was armed and separated from him by a physical barrier. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory meaning of 'imminent'—defined as 'near, at hand, or on the verge of happening'—and determined that a threat is judged by the aggressor's volatility and conduct rather than the victim's defensive capabilities. The court held that the display of a deadly weapon combined with combative posturing is sufficient to establish an imminent threat, regardless of whether the victim has a weapon or is behind glass.
Litigation Takeaway
"A threat of family violence remains 'imminent' even if the victim takes defensive measures or is separated from the aggressor by a barrier; the legal focus is on the aggressor's display of weaponry and volatility rather than the victim's relative safety."
In Re Germania Farm Mutual Insurance Association
COA13
In an insurance appraisal dispute, a trial court struck a contractually appointed neutral umpire and unilaterally appointed a replacement based on the homeowner's claim of bias. The evidence of bias was solely a prior order from an unrelated case where another judge had set aside one of the umpire's awards. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion, concluding that 'prior bad acts' in unrelated matters do not meet the high evidentiary bar for 'evident partiality.' The court emphasized that specific evidence of bias in the current proceeding is required and that trial courts cannot ignore contractually mandated selection processes when appointing replacements.
Litigation Takeaway
"Parties cannot disqualify a court-appointed professional—such as a custody evaluator or receiver—based on vague reputations or prior adverse rulings in unrelated cases; disqualification requires specific, admissible proof of bias or partiality within the current litigation."
Bravo v. Bravo
COA02
In Bravo v. Bravo, a Husband challenged a final divorce decree that appointed the Wife as sole managing conservator, denied him all access to his children, and ordered child support. He argued he received only four days' notice of the trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 and the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that because the Husband's attorney appeared and announced 'ready' at trial, any objection to the 45-day notice requirement was waived. Furthermore, because the Husband failed to provide a reporter’s record (the transcript of the trial), the court applied an irrebuttable presumption that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the judge's rulings. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decree in its entirety.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural technicalities can win or lose an appeal before it even begins. In Texas family law, if your attorney announces 'ready' for a hearing, you waive any right to complain about lack of notice. Additionally, you cannot win an appeal based on 'lack of evidence' if you fail to provide the appellate court with the transcript of the trial; without that record, the court will automatically assume the trial judge had enough evidence to make their ruling."
Caldwell v. Quaid
COA14
In a divorce proceeding involving complex property characterization, the Husband designated an expert for tracing and valuation but failed to provide the actual tracing reports until six days before trial. The trial court excluded the late-disclosed tracing testimony while permitting testimony on the timely-disclosed valuation. On appeal, the Husband argued the exclusion constituted an improper 'death-penalty' sanction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, clarifying that the exclusion was a mandatory application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The court held that because the ruling did not preclude the Husband's entire defense or claim, it did not rise to the level of a death-penalty sanction and was a proper exercise of discretion due to the lack of good cause or showing of non-prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Discovery deadlines are strictly enforced for expert reports in property disputes; a trial continuance does not automatically reset these deadlines. Practitioners should never use 'to be provided' as a placeholder in expert designations and must produce the substance of tracing opinions within the discovery period to avoid the 'automatic' exclusion of evidence under Rule 193.6."
In Re Biles
COA14
Sarah Paige Biles sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to enter a final judgment based on a 2024 Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) and to vacate temporary orders issued over a year later. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that Biles failed to meet the heavy burden required for mandamus relief. The court concluded she did not demonstrate that the trial court's refusal to sign the decree was a clear abuse of discretion or that she lacked an adequate remedy through the standard appellate process once a final judgment is eventually signed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A binding Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) does not guarantee immediate enforcement through a writ of mandamus; to bypass the standard appeal process, you must provide a specific record showing that the trial court\'s delay or intervening orders will cause irreparable harm that cannot be corrected on appeal."
In Re Darren L. Reagan
COA05
Darren L. Reagan filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate a trial court's order granting a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The Dallas Court of Appeals denied the petition without reaching the substantive legal merits because the relator failed to comply with the technical requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, the court analyzed the petition's failure to use the verbatim certification language now required by the renumbered Rule 52.3(k) and the failure to provide a sworn or certified record under Rule 52.7(a). The court held that strict adherence to the "exact words" of the appellate rules is a mandatory prerequisite for the court to exercise its jurisdiction for extraordinary relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Technicalities can defeat even the strongest legal arguments. In the Dallas Court of Appeals, a mandamus petition will be summarily denied if the certification does not match the 2026 version of Rule 52.3(k) word-for-word or if the supporting record is not properly authenticated. Always perform a 'procedural audit' to ensure compliance with the latest appellate rule numbering and verbatim requirements."
IN RE ADNAN UMAIR JANJUA AND UZMA JANJUA, Relators
COA05
The Fifth Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed against a county clerk who allegedly refused to file specific documents. The court analyzed its jurisdiction under Texas Government Code § 22.221, noting that while it has the power to issue writs against judges, its authority over non-judicial officers like clerks is strictly limited to instances where the writ is necessary to protect the court's own appellate jurisdiction. Because the relators did not demonstrate that the clerk's refusal interfered with a pending appeal, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to intervene.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot 'leapfrog' the trial court when a clerk refuses to file a document; you must first file a motion to compel in the trial court and obtain a ruling from the judge before seeking mandamus relief from a Court of Appeals."
EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, Procore Technologies, Inc., Express Lien, Inc. d/b/a Levelset, Michael Mann, and J. Earnhart, Inc.
COA05
In EarnhartBuilt, LLC v. Preferred Materials, LLC, a materials supplier filed a lien to collect $17,000 for concrete delivered to a construction project. The property owner sued, claiming the lien was "fraudulent" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 12.002 because it was filed after the statutory deadline. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the "knowledge" and "intent" requirements of the statute, distinguishing between a lien that is merely legally invalid and one that is fraudulent. The court held that because the underlying debt for the materials was legitimate, the supplier did not have the requisite "actual knowledge" of fraudulence at the time of filing, even if the lien was procedurally defective. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the supplier.
Litigation Takeaway
"A lien is not "fraudulent" simply because it is legally unenforceable or filed late. To recover statutory damages for a fraudulent lien, a party must prove the filer actually knew the lien was fraudulent—meaning a misrepresentation of the truth—at the moment of filing. If there is a bona fide underlying debt, technical or procedural failures will generally not trigger the severe penalties of the fraudulent lien statute."